1 1 0 V O L U M E 8 , D O C U M E N T 6 2 0 a
imposing limiting law as long as physical experience cannot afford any reason
against this limit, . . . . . is, according to my current view, [still] a death-defying leap
of reason (but a “forgivable” one). [It’s wonderful, you know, how Spinoza antici-
pates scientific progress—defines something as “freedom” that shouldnÊt be a free-
dom at all in the sense of causal detachment: how well its structure entirely suits
the word in the end, even in this sense, even if it only refers to the cognitive
Now, however, after the transgression of the boundary has been ex-
posed as illegitimate, adherence to determinism, different from a working hypoth-
esis in natural science, therefore strikes me as a belief or as a very mystical faith.
We must assume certain primordial elements of the mental “replica” of the uni-
verse: whence the primordial facts of consciousness: admission of the past pos-
sibility of the future; existence of at least one constructive principles within the
framework of this possibility. Excluding precisely these primordial facts is a pro-
cess that the history of science has justified as a temporary process which I, how-
ever, regard as infinitely “improbable,” at least for the final mental state.
The ultimate thing is the irreducibility of existence. A creative person creates
for himself pictures of the whole, in which the creator’s personal introspective fo-
cus, his “navel,” must inhere—Spinoza’s “navel” in this sense is amor intellectua-
lis. Another navel is in modern-day physics of processes [Geschehensphysik],
which essentially just describes a 4-dimensional existence, the cone of conscious-
ness describing existence :: better still, what matters is what comes [out] the other
I do think, incidentally, that I’m battering down a wide-open door. You’re surely
only saying: “in physics this view doesn’t have any rights of citizenship yet. As
soon as anyone gets anywhere with it (and not before!), I may concern myself with
it as a physicist.” Against which I, of course, can’t counter anything, nor do I want
Warm greetings, yours,
Vol. 8, 620a. To Heinrich Zangger
[Berlin,] 21 September [1918]
Dear Zangger,
You don’t write a thing about my proposal that I’m willing to offer a lecture for
a month each semester at
Meyer for his part is agreed but hasn’t spoken
to anyone yet. According to his view, if all goes smoothly, I should appear for the
first time on February
That’s why I want to drop the trip for now, especially
considering that the semester is already starting here and I have announced a lecture.
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