DOC. 29 ERNST MACH
141
Doc. 29
Ernst
Mach
by
A.
Einstein
[p.
101]
Recently
Ernst Mach left
us-a
man
who in
our
times had the
greatest
influence
upon
[1]
the
epistemological
orientation
of
natural
scientists,
a man
of
rare independence
of
judgment.
In
him,
the direct
joy
of
seeing
and
understanding-Spinoza's
amor
dei
intellectualis-was
so prevalent
that he could look into the world with the curious
eyes
of
a child, even
in
his old
age,
and thus be
perfectly happy
to
enjoy
himself
by
understanding
interwoven
connections.
But
why
does
a
properly gifted
natural scientist
care
for
epistemology
at all? Is
there
no more
important
work in his
field? That's what I hear
many a colleague say,
and I
sense
that
even more
feel that
way.
I
cannot share this conviction. When I think
of
the most able students
I
met in
my teaching-and
I
mean
those who
distinguished
themselves
not just
by mere
skills but
by
their
independence
in
judgment-then
I
must
state
that
they
all had
a
lively
interest in
epistemology. They
liked
to
start
discussions about the final
goals
and methods of the
sciences,
and showed without
doubt,
by
the hardheadedness with which
they
defended their
views,
that the
topic
was important
to
them. And this is not
surprising.
If
I
turn toward
a
science not for external
reasons
such
as earning
an income, or
for
ambition,
and
also
not-or at
least
not
exclusively-for
the
mere sportive joy
and
the fun
of
brain-acrobatics,
then
I
must ask
myself
the
question:
what is the
final
goal
that the science
I
am
devoted to will and
can
reach? To what
extent
are
its
general
results "true"? What is essential and what is based
only on
accident in its
develop-
ment?
In order to
appreciate
Mach's
merits, one
must not ask the
question:
what has
Mach found
in
all these
general
questions
that
no
man
before him
saw or
thought
of?
Again
and
again,
the truth in these
things
must be chiseled out
by energetic
personalities,
and
must
always
be
commensurate
with the needs
of
the
times in which
the
sculptor
works.
If
this
truth
is
not
always
created
anew,
we
will
finally
lose it
altogether.
Hence
it
is
difficult,
albeit also
not
so
essential,
to
answer
the
question: [p.
102]
what
did Mach
teach
us
that
would,
in
principle,
be
new
when
compared
to
Bacon
and Hume?
Or, as
far
as
the
general epistemological
point
of
view toward individual
sciences
is
concerned,
what
distinguishes
him
basically
from Stuart
Mill, Kirchhoff,
Hertz,
Helmholtz?
It is
a
fact that Mach has had tremendous
impact
upon
our
generation
of natural
scientists,
in
particular
with his historical-critical
writings
where
he
follows the
evolution
of
individual sciences with
so
much
love,
where he
probes
practically
the most remote brain cells
of
researchers who broke
new
paths
in their