DOC. 42 SPECIAL
AND GENERAL RELATIVITY
399
160
Relativity
ment gives
rise
to
the
subjective concept
of
time,
i.e.
that
concept
of
time which refers
to
the
arrangement
of
the
expe-
riences of the individual.
What do
we mean
by rendering objective
the
concept
of
time?
Let
us
consider
an
example.
A
person A
("I")
has
the
experience
"it
is
lightning."
At
the
same
time the
person A
also
experiences
such
a
behaviour of
the
person
B
as
brings
the behaviour of
B
into relation with
his
own
experience
"it
is
lightning."
Thus
it
comes
about
that
A
associates with
B
the
experience
"it
is
lightning."
For
the
person A
the idea arises
that
other
persons
also
participate
in the
experience
"it
is
lightning."
"It
is
lightning" is
now no
longer interpreted
as an
exclusively personal experience,
but
as
an
experience
of
other
persons
(or eventually
only as a
"potential
experience").
In
this
way
arises
the
interpretation
that "it
is
lightning,"
which
originally
entered
into
the
consciousness of
an
"experience,"
is
now
also interpreted
as an
(objective)
"event." It
is
just
the
sum
total
of
all
events
that
we
mean
when
we
speak
of
the
"real external world."
We have
seen
that
we
feel ourselves
impelled to
ascribe
a
temporal arrangement to
our
experiences,
somewhat
as
fol-
lows.
If
ß
is
later than
a
and
y
later than
ß,
then
y
is
also
later
than
a
("sequence
of
experiences").
Now what
is
the
position
in this
respect
with the
"events"
which
we
have associated
with
the
experiences?
At
first
sight
it
seems
obvious
to
assume
that
a
temporal arrangement
of
events
exists which
agrees
with the
temporal arrangement
of the
experiences.
In
general,
and
unconsciously
this
was
done,
until
sceptical
doubts made