396
DOC.
395
OCTOBER
1917
were
not
the
case, we
could
not
understand the
musical
sequence,
and what
has
gone
before would have been lost.
These circumstances
are
illustrated
very
well
in
the
following diagram,
which
can
be found in the
“Psychology”
article of
the
Encyclopaedia
Britannica.[11]
You
see
how each section
experienced
projects
the
momentary
final
state,
other-
wise
we
could
not characterize
the
section
in
question
as
experienced by
us
at
all
and
thus it
would be
as
little
present
to
us as
to
any
other
person
unknown to
us.
This
is
because,
for each state
as
such,
any
others
are
not
there;
what it
experiences
is
merely
the
projection
of
the
other.
Hence
there
are as
many
different states
of
this
kind
as
there
are
different
sections of
the
various musical
works.
For
ex.,
the
state
we
experience
during
the
xth
quarter note
of the
yth
measure
of
the
zth
movement
of the
uth
symphony by
Beethoven
is
a very
specific
one
and different to
every
other
one
of
the
sort,
just
as
the
entirety
of
the
portion of
the
symphony played up
to
then
differs from
any
other
section
of
this and
any
other
symphony.
The
manifold
of
these states
is
rich
enough
for
someone
who
is
just
capable
of
grasping
short
melodies;
how much
richer and
more
finely graded
are
these states for the
musically
inclined!
It
is true
that
within
a
state
we
comprehend
more
clearly
the
part
having elapsed only
a
short
time
before,
and those
further
away increasingly less; yet
for
the
musically
minded this
continuity
must
also extend
beyond
the individual
movement to
the
entire
piece,
since otherwise it would not
matter
to
us
during
the
second
movement
whether the
first movement had been
played beforehand,
or
instead
nothing
at
all,
or
another
movement
altogether.
I believe,
when
you
think about
these
things,
you
must
realize
the
necessity
for these
subtlest
of
gradations
of
the
projections
in each state and how rich
they
are
in
the
conception
of
a
great
musical work
of
art.
You must
just
keep clearly
in mind
that
each
momentary
state
possesses
nothing
and
knows
about
nothing
other than what
it itself
contains,
as
if
the
whole rest
of
the
world did not exist.
The
same
considerations
as
those
about
music also
apply
to
the
apprehension
of
the
spoken
sentence;
yet
in order to realize
that
something
quite
different from
word
melody apprehension
is
involved
here in
addition,
one
must
keep clearly
in
mind
that
our
abstract
thought
also
is
composed
of
characteristic colorations of
our
consciousness
and
not
merely
of
words
or
of
graphic
notions. Even
if
one
forms
no
graphic notions,
when
hearing
the
word
“triangle” one
has
a
different
state of mind from
someone
who does not
understand German and
a
different
one
from when
one
hears
the word
“quadrangle,”
and
likewise
with
every
other