DOC.
395
OCTOBER
1917
393
mistake that, for
years
now,
all
popular
books have been
treating
as dogma
that
we
knew of bodies whose
mass was
1/2000
of
the
hydrogen atom,
with
the
result
that
all
laymen (and
all
physicists
as
well)
regard
this
as secure
knowledge.
I
think
anyone
who considers this must find
that the
hypothesis
is
not
based
on
experience.-
I
come
now
to
your reply
to
my philosophical
theory.[5]
You
write,
first of
all,
that
a consequence
of
my theory
would be
that the
only
real facts
of
pure
experience are
those of
a
present
state
of
consciousness.
Indeed, I
myself
have
always emphasized
this to be correct in
a
specific sense, namely,
that
a
momentary
state would notice
nothing
if,
apart
from
itself,
the
entire
remaining
world did not
exist
and that
hence instantaneous
solipsism
is
logically
possible.
Thus
I
also
now
find
the
expression,
facts of
pure
experience,
to
be not
very
well
chosen, giving
rise
to
this
misunderstanding.
I
actually
intend
something
else
and do not seek in
any
way
to
grapple
with
solipsismal
and
ultrasolipsismal
doubts.-
I
initially
assume
that,
by
its
quality
and
quite generally speaking,
consciousness
is
an
actual
and
absolute
reality
and
is
not
merely fictitious,
such
as are
physical objects perhaps.
What
types
of consciousness
actually
do exist
concretely
is
another
question.
Whether another
absolute
reality
also exists in addition
to
conscious
reality,
I
regard
at
the
very
least
as
uncertain,
and
even assume
that
the
only
reality
type
known
to
us
is
also
the
only
one
that
really
exists.
Now,
with
this notion
I
approach
our
normal
positive
worldview and
attempt to
establish
what
of
it
belongs
within this
reality
of consciousness and what does
not.
Since this
reality
of
consciousness
is
the
only
one we
really
know,
this isolation of it from
our
worldview
seems
to
me
to
be
one
of
the
most
important
philosophical
missions.
In
doing
so,
I
arrive at
the
frequently
mentioned result
of
the orderless
set of
states
of consciousness. In
consequence
of starting out
from
the
positive worldview, I
have
nothing
directly
to
do with the
epistemological problem
of
(instantaneous)
solipsism
and
merely
use as an
auxiliary
consideration
the
possibility
of
assuming
that
for each state
nothing
outside
of
itself
exists,
in order
to
show
that
the
order
of
the
states does
not
belong directly
within consciousness.
It
would therefore be
better
if,
instead
of facts
of
pure experience,
I
say facts
of
pure
consciousness.
My
method
of
determining
whether
something
is
a
part
of
pure
consciousness
is, as
you know,
that
I
negate
the
matter in
question
and
see
whether
something
is
changed
in
the
world
of consciousness.[6]
This method
is, purely logically,
a
simple
tautology,
and
one can
establish what
belongs
within
pure
consciousness
and
what
does not
without this
auxiliary
consideration;
it
merely serves as a
more
forceful
illustration.
I
hope
these distinctions have become clear and
that
when
I
say pure
consciousness
rather than
pure experience,
this
objection
no
longer
applies
to
me.
I
am
not concerned with how
we can
experience something
and