3 2 4 D O C . 3 2 1 R E V I E W E L S B A C H
to add the wish that the position of “conventionalism” (which probably refers to
Poincaré’s epistemological position on physics) be given more attention in the sec-
ond
edition.[4]
In the fifth chapter, “Summary of Critical Philosophy and Its Relation to Rela-
tivity Theory,” one first encounters a profoundly thought-through characterization
of Kant’s teachings as far as adopted by neo-Kantians. Then on pp.
281–301[5]
the
author arrives at a point that is of crucial importance to an assessment of the relation
between Kantian teachings and relativity theory, indeed for an assessment of Kan-
tian teachings overall. There is the thesis (not cited verbatim): Critical idealism can
neither contradict science nor anticipate any of its
results.[6]
For, this philosophical
scholarship accepts the essence of concepts and relations of science as the material
it must deal with, just as natural science accepts the experimental data from the ob-
servation of nature. From this the author concludes that the individual theses of crit-
ical epistemology cannot raise claim to being valid independently of the respective
state of science at a given time. I think that here the author would be in agreement
with neither Mohammed nor the Prophet. It is my conviction that it was the goal of
Kant and all Kantians to locate those a priori (i.e., not deducible from experience)
concepts and relations that must be the foundation of every science because without
them science is not conceivable at all. Assuming this goal really is achievable and
has been achieved, those a priori elements could not come into conflict with any
future reasonable physical theory. Kant considered this goal achievable and be-
lieved he had achieved it. If one does not consider this goal achievable, one proba-
bly should not call oneself a “Kantian.”
Until some time ago, it could be regarded as possible that Kant’s system of a-
priori concepts and norms really could withstand the test of time. This was defen-
sible as long as the content of later science held to be
confirmed*)
did not violate
those norms. This case occurred indisputably only with the theory of relativity.
However, if one does not want to assert that relativity theory goes against reason,
one cannot retain the a priori concepts and norms of Kant’s system.
For starters, this does not exclude, at least, the retention of Kant’s way of posing
the problem, as Cassirer, for instance, does. I am even of the opinion that this stand-
point cannot be strictly refuted by any scientific development. For, one will always
be able to say that critical philosophers had hitherto erred in setting up the a priori
elements and one will always be able to set up a system of a priori elements that
does not conflict with a given physical system. I surely may briefly indicate why I
*)
To refute Kant’s system it actually suffices to indicate a logically conceivable theory
(corresponding to conceivable observational material) that conflicts with Kantian norms.
Whether non-Euclidean geometries accomplished this remained controversial.
[col. 1688]
[col. 1689]