D O C . 3 2 1 R E V I E W E L S B A C H 5 0 3 Published in Deutsche Literaturzeitung 1 (1924): cols. 1685–1692. [1]Elsbach 1924. Alfred Coppel Elsbach (1896–1932). [2]Hermann Cohen (1842–1918), Professor of Philosophy at the University of Marburg Paul Natorp (1854–1924), Professor of Philosophy and Pedagogy at the University of Marburg Ernst Cas- sirer. All were prominent representatives of the so-called Marburg school of neo-Kantian philosophy. [3]The quote is from p. 123. Quotation marks are missing after “Ganzen.” The same sentence, as the central thesis of chap. 4 in Elsbach’s book, is also found on p. 145. [4]For Elsbach’s remarks in chap. 4 on the position of conventionalism, see p. 156. [5]The page references should be to pp. 180–201. [6]See, e.g., the following passage: “[…] that epistemology cannot contradict science. If the rela- tion between critical philosophy and science is thus that the former takes the sciences as a point of departure, in the sense that epistemology takes everything for granted that science tells us, then any contradiction between both, and hence also between the Kantian doctrines and the theory of relativity, is made impossible from the very beginning. And we can conclude with certainty, already before looking at the critical doctrine of space and time, that this theory of space and time is in full agreement with that of physics (“[…] daß die Erkenntnistheorie nicht im Widerspruch stehen kann zur Natur- wissenschaft. Wenn das Verhältnis von kritischer Philosophie und Wissenschaft derart liegt, daß jene die Naturwissenschaft zum Ausgangspunkt nimmt, in dem Sinne, daß die Erkenntnistheorie alles, was die Naturwissenschaft lehrt, zunächst einfach hinnimmt, dann ist ein Gegensatz zwischen beiden und folglich auch zwischen den Kantischen Lehren und der Relativitätstheorie grundsätzlich von Anfang an ausgeschlossen, und wir können schon, sogar bevor wir die kritische Raum- und Zeitlehre betrachtet haben, mit Sicherheit darauf schließen, daß diese Raum- und Zeittheorie völlig mit derje- nigen der Physik übereinstimmt” p. 181). [7]On pp. 192–194, Elsbach criticizes both Lorentz and Einstein for misinterpreting logical argu- ments as epistemological ones. He refers to the claim in Lorentz 1920, p. 23, that the decision between the contraction hypothesis and the special theory of relativity would belong to the field of epistemol- ogy. He also refers to Einstein’s consideration of two rotating spheres hovering in empty space, one of which should show an ellipsoidal shape if rotating against absolute space whereas only the relative motion of the two spheres would in principle be observable. In Einstein 1916e (Vol. 6, Doc. 30 Els- bach cites from Lorentz et al. 1920), p. 772, Einstein calls the argument that absolute space would hence be the cause of an observable difference while not being subject to observation itself a “weighty epistemological argument” (“ein schwerwiegendes erkenntnistheoretisches Argument”) for the necessity of postulating general covariance. Elsbach claims that the explanation of the distortion of one of the spheres in terms of absolute space would be “a way of explaining that is not satisfactory, because our logical feeling would balk at explanations in which geometric lines are ascribed physical effects” (“eine Erklärungsweise […], die nicht befriedigt, weil unser logisches Gefühl sich gegen Erklärungen sträubt, bei denen geometrische Linien physikalische Wirkung zugeschrieben wird” (p. 193). What Einstein calls an “epistemological flaw” (“erkenntnistheoretische Mangel,” Einstein 1916e [Vol. 6, Doc. 30], p. 771) would therefore be, according to Elsbach, “a generally logical flaw […], i.e., such an inadequacy that both a non-physicist as well as a non-epistemologist can feel the weakness of this inadequacy” (“ein allgemein logischer Mangel […], d.h. eine derartige Unzuläng- lichkeit, daß sowohl ein Nichtphysiker wie auch ein Nichterkenntnistheoretiker die schwache Stelle als einen Mangel herausfühlen kann” p. 194). In a footnote, Elsbach points out that in Einstein’s later Princeton lectures, the consequence is no longer referred to as violating an epistemological principle, but rather as contrary to scientific thinking: “[…] it is contrary to the mode of thinking in science to conceive of a thing (the space-time continuum) which acts itself, but which cannot be acted upon” (“[…] widerstrebt es dem wissenschaftlichen Verstande, ein Ding zu setzen [nämlich das zeit-räum- liche Kontinuum], was zwar wirkt, auf welches aber nicht gewirkt werden kann” Einstein 1922c ([Vol. 7, Doc. 71], p. 36). Elsbach again refers to this criticism of Lorentz and Einstein as conflating logical and epistemological arguments on p. 318. [8]Among the authors discussed by Elsbach are Richard Hönigswald and Ewald Sellien (see, e.g., pp. 292–295). [9]Possibly a reference to a comment by Elsbach (p. 268) on Einstein’s analysis of the concept of simultaneity, as discussed in Einstein 1917a (Vol. 6, Doc. 42), p. 14. [10]For further discussion of this review, see Hentschel 1987, Giovanelli 2013, and Howard 2014.