DOC.
364
JULY
1917 357
for
whom the
phenomena
are
known to
us.-
As
long
as no
difference in
simplicity
can
be found in
the
points
of
view of
various
observers,
the
theory
of
relativity
has
a
right
to
question
the
quite
arbitrary
definition
of
a
particular
one as
true.
If, on
the other
hand,
one
observer’s
system
is
demonstrated
to be
simpler,
if
only
with
regard
to
the
integrated
equations,
then the
theory
does not
necessarily
have
this
right
anymore.
To
this
extent, emphasis
on
the fact
that the
phenomena
are
represented
more
simply
in
a
specific
coordinate
system
does
seem
to
me
to be
of
certain
epistemological importance.
It
has
frequently
been
pointed out,
of
course,
that
Lorentz’s
system
of
the
“ether at rest”
can never
be
refuted;
but this
would
have to be
rejected,
after
all,
without further
ado
if
no
preference
for
a
particular
system
could be
found;
but
if
this does
happen,
the
epistemological
situation
is
somewhat different.
I
would
like
to
interpret
my
and Adler’s ideas
in
this
sense.
Yet all of
this
is less important
to
me
than that
I
now
have
the
opportunity
of
establishing
contact with
you,
to
send
you
two
philosophical
articles
which,
as
I
hope,
will
interest
you.
The first of
these,
on
real
facts, etc.,
treats
the
problem
that
seems
to
me
to
be fundamental to
knowledge as a
whole,
of
how
the
immediate elements
of
consciousness
are
actually
composed.[7]
And since
you
take
a
phenomenalistic
point of
view,
based
on
Mach’s
epistemology,
I
believe
that
this
problem
will
appear
also
to
you
as
a, or,
the fundamental
problem
in
philosophy.
I believe to
have found
a simple answer
to
this
problem.
Although
my paper
has been
published
for
a long
while
now, as
far
as
I
know,
it has not been
given
much notice
by philosophers.
In
the
Zeitschrift
für
positivistische Philosophie,
which
you
also
know,[8]
there
is
a
detailed
but
critical discussion of
it.[9]
For
the
basic idea
is
a
bit
too
mathematically
abstract
for
philosophy,
and deviates from
normal
conceptions. Although philosophers
believe
they
can
understand
very
abstract
things,
in
reality,
they
only
think
that
they
can
understand
thoughts
that had
been conceived in
a
confused
way
by
their
authors;
they
are
mostly quite
helpless
when faced
with
really clear,
abstract
ideas,
as
has been
seen
especially
clearly
with
your principle
of
relativity. My
interpretation
of what
is
given
differs
from Mach’s in
many
points.
I
fully
agree
with his
epistemological conception
of
science
as an
economical
description
of
facts established
through
experience.
Mach
says
in his
Analysis of
Sensations: One does not
emphasize
the
unity
of
consciousness.[10]
But
how
can one
neglect precisely
this
quality
of
it,
which
is
the
most essential
formal
quality
of
the
essence
of
all consciousness in
the
world:
the
unity
of
consciousness,
on
the
one
hand,
and its
“disjection,”
on
the
other! This
unity is
surely
of
greater
fundamental
significance
than
any
qualitative property
of
consciousness,
thus
also
than
all
natural
laws,
which
merely
discuss
regularities,
that
is,
similar
qualities
in various elements of consciousness.
Although
I
did not
expect it,
I
heard that
Mach also
took
an
interest in
my paper,
which
I
sent him
in
1914.