360 DOC.
364
JULY
1917
corresponds
to
an
infinite set of
elements of consciousness.
I
also did not
know
that the
concept
of
an
infinitesimal distance
is altogether
inadmissible in
an
exact
description
of
the
continuum,
so
that
my paper
contains
an error
also in
this
regard
which, however,
is
insignificant
to
the
main
issue.[14]
I
hope
to
find
better
appreciation
from
you,
a
physicist
to whom
epistemology
is
a
part
of
life
and
to
whom
abstract
conceptions
do not
present any
difficulties.
Admittedly, my
theory
does
go
very
much
against
a
person’s senses; many
balk
at
this absolute
disjectioning
of consciousness into
separate
“monads,”[15]
and
Mach’s
world,
with
disjointed sensations,
will
be
more
attractive
particularly
to
the
scientist.
However,
this
perhaps unpleasant
quality
of
the
world of conscious-
ness
cannot
be ignored.
One
may
be
an
instantaneous
solipsist,
if
one
wishes,
for whom
nothing
exists
other than the
momentary
state
of
consciousness;
but
if
anything
outside
of
this element
is
assumed,
there
is
no way
of
getting
around
the
fact
that the other
consciousness
is
a
foreign one, disjected
from the
given
state,
that
is,
not
only
that
of
other
persons,
but
also
that
which
we
call
our
own
past
or
future
consciousness
and,
as
peculiar
as
this
interpretation
is,
in
an
entirely equivalent
way.
Thus
my system agrees entirely
with Mach’s denial of
the
identical
self,
but
must be in conflict
with the
dissolution of
the
immediately
given
element
of
“sensations,”
which
are
united
simultaneously
within
a
state.-
If
you
point
out
that
in
physics
we only
observe
“spatio-temporal coinciden-
ces,”[16]
you yourself
are
resorting
to
the
unitary
state of
consciousness,
which
comprises simultaneously
with the observation
a
small
spatial
area.
However,
a
dissolution of
the
physical space-time
continuum into
the
individual
space-time
points, analogous
to
the
philosophical theory,
and
a
relativization of its
order,
thus
irregular
transformations,
probably
would not
be
possible.
In
the
second
paper
I
am
sending
you,
I
address
a
not
quite
so
abstract
problem
of
a
cosmological
nature.[17]
In
it,
I
argue
from certain
simple
and
frequently made,
though
unprovable
assumptions:
the
infinity
of
the
universe in
space
and
time;[18]
the
similarity,
in
principle,
of
phenomena
in
this
universe based
on
natural
laws;
and
the exclusion
of
singular points;
of
these
assumptions,
I attempt
to
prove
that
for
every
existing object
and
process,
there
are
infinitely many
indistinguishably
similar
ones,
to
an
arbitrary
degree
of
precision,
and what
is
more shocking
to
most,
that
everything
in
anyway possible,
even
the
most
improbable
things,
must
be realized somewhere.
Many people
feel
strongly opposed
to
the
consequences
of
my
second
paper
as well,
in
that
they
either do
not want
to believe
the
conclusion,
or
merely
because of this
result,
think
they
must
reject
the
premises,
which would
otherwise not be
disagreeable
to them.
I
hope
to
meet
with
better
appreciation
on
your
part
for these
thoughts
as
well
than
I
have
with
others,
who
shy away
from bold conclusions.